![]() If so, then we might be able to both heed Wittgenstein’s command to mind the differences between forms of thought and yet still hold onto the idea that we can have true beliefs about morality or economics or mathematics. Moral propositions, for example, might be true by being part of a coherent moral theory, while propositions about physical objects might be true by corresponding to the facts about those objects. If the pluralist position can be made coherent, then there is more to say about truth than the deflationist believes, but the more there is to say depends on the type of proposition in question 3. Pluralism has been getting an increasing amount of attention, and perhaps it is not hard to see why 2. 3 In what follows, I will use “proposition” as my favored term for whatever bears the property of tr (.)ĤIn this paper, I want to examine the prospects for a third response, namely that propositions can be true in different ways.The second strategy dismisses the whole project of giving a metaphysical theory of truth, and declares that all propositions are equally apt for truth in a uniform but entirely thin sense. This is the strategy favored by expressivists, error-theorists, fictionalists and so on. Those adopting the first strategy hold fast to their favored theory of truth and deny that various troublesome propositions are true, or even capable of being true. ![]() This can be called the scope problem 1.ģPhilosophers generally adopt one of two strategies in response to this problem. ![]() Indeed, and as a number of philosophers have suggested, the history of the debate over truth suggests that for any sufficiently robustly characterized truth property F, there appears to be some kind of propositions K which lack F but which are intuitively true (or capable of being true). And theories that seem plausible when applied to the propositions about norms (such as, perhaps, the coherence theory) seem much less convincing when applied to propositions about the physical world. Theories that seem plausible when applied to propositions about the physical world around us (such as the correspondence theory) are less plausible when applied to propositions about norms.
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